This presentation will attempt to address the issue of whether the engineering design community has the knowledge, data and tool sets required to undertake advanced evacuation analysis. In discussing this issue I want to draw on examples not only from the building industry but more widely from where ever people come into contact with an environment fashioned by man. Prescriptive design regulations the world over suggest that if we follow a particular set of essentially configurational regulations concerning travel distances, number of exits, exit widths, etc it should be possible to evacuate a structure within a predefined acceptable amount of time. In the U.K. for public buildings this turns out to be 2.5 minutes, internationally in the aviation industry this is 90 seconds, in the UK rail industry this is 90 seconds and the international standard adopted by the maritime industry is 60 minutes. The difficulties and short comings of this approach are well known and so I will not repeat them here, save to say that this approach is usually littered with "magic numbers" that do not stand up to scrutiny. As we are focusing on human behaviour issues, it is also worth noting that more generally, the approach fails to take into account how people actually behave, preferring to adopt an engineer's view of what people should do in order to make their design work. Examples of the failure of this approach are legion and include the; Manchester Boeing 737 fire, Kings Cross underground station fire, Piper Alpha oil platform explosion, Ladbroke Grove Rail crash and fire, Mont Blanc tunnel fire, Scandinavian Star ferry fire and the Station Nightclub fire.
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