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Strategic bidding for multiple units in simultaneous and sequential auctions

机译:同时和连续拍卖中多个单位的战略竞标

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A buyer may be interested in buying a bundle of items, where any one item in the bundle may not be of particular interest. The emergence of online auctions allows such users to obtain bundles by bidding on different simultaneous or sequentially run auctions. Because the number of auctions and the number of combinations to form the bundles may be large, the bundle bidding problem becomes intractable and the user is likely to make suboptimal decision given time constraints and information overload. We believe that an automated agent that can take user preferences and budgetary constraints and can strategically bid on behalf of a user can significantly enhance user profit and satisfaction. Our first step to build such an agent is to consider bundles containing many units of a single a item and auctions that sell only multiple units of one item type. We assume that users obtain goods over several days. Expectations of auctions and their outcome in the future allow the agent to bid strategically on currently open auctions. The agent decides how many items to bid for in the current auctions, and the maximum price to bid for each item. We evaluate our proposed strategy in different configurations: number of items sold, number of auctions opened, expected closing prices, etc. The agent produces greater returns in situations where future auctions can provide better profit, and where not too many agents use our proposed strategy.
机译:买方可能有兴趣购买一捆物品,其中捆绑包中的任何一个项目可能都不特别感兴趣。在线拍卖的出现允许这些用户通过在不同的同时或顺序运行拍卖上竞标来获取捆绑包。因为拍卖的次数和形成捆绑的组合的数量可能很大,所以束竞标问题变得棘手,并且用户可能会对时间约束和信息过载进行次优判定。我们认为,可以采取用户偏好和预算限制的自动代理,并代表用户战略性竞标,可以显着提高用户的利润和满足。我们构建此类代理的第一步是考虑包含单个项目和拍卖单元的许多单位的捆绑包,该套件仅销售多个项目类型的多个单位。我们假设用户在几天内获得货物。对未来的拍卖期望及其结果允许代理人在目前开放的拍卖中战略性地竞标。代理商决定在当前拍卖中出价的项目数量,以及每个项目的最高价格。我们以不同的配置评估我们提出的策略:销售的项目数量,开放的拍卖数,预期的闭幕价格等。该代理商在未来拍卖可以提供更好的利润的情况下产生更大的回报,并且没有太多代理商使用我们提出的策略。

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