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Allocation of Transportation Cost CO_2 Emission in Pooled Supply Chains Using Cooperative Game Theory

机译:合作博弈论汇集供应链中运输成本和CO_2排放的分配

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The sustainability of supply chain, both economical and ecological, has attracted intensive attentions of academic, and industry. It is proven in former works that supply chain pooling given by horizontal cooperation among several independent supply chains create a new common supply chain network that could reduce the costs and the transport CO_2 emissions. In this regard, this paper introduces a scheme to share in a fairly manner the savings. After a summary of the concept of pooled-supply-networks optimization and CO_2 emission model, we use cooperative game theory as the cooperative mechanism for the implementation of the horizontal pooling. Since we proved the related pooling game to be super-additive, a fair and stable allocation of common gain in transportation cost and CO_2 emission is calculated by Shapley Value concept. Through a case study, the results show that supply chains pooling can result in reductions of both transportation cost and carbon emissions, and that the increase of carbon-tax rate gives enterprises only marginal incentives for the implementation of such pooling scheme.
机译:供应链的可持续性,经济和生态,都引起了学术界的密集关注。它是在前的作品中证明,在几个独立的供应链中横向合作提供的供应链汇集创造了一种新的常见供应链网络,可以降低成本和运输CO_2排放。在这方面,本文介绍了一个以相当的方式分享的计划。在汇集供应网络优化和CO_2发射模型的概念概述之后,我们使用合作博弈论作为实现水平池的合作机制。由于我们证明了相关的汇集游戏是超级添加剂,因此通过福芙价值概念计算了运输成本和CO_2排放的公平和稳定分配。通过案例研究,结果表明,供应链汇集可导致运输成本和碳排放的减少,碳税率的增加仅为企业提供了实施此类汇集计划的边际激励措施。

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