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Restricting Access with Certificate Attributes in Multiple Root Environments - A Recipe for Certificate Masquerading

机译:在多根根环境中限制与证书属性的访问 - 伪装证书的配方

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The issue of certificate masquerading against the SSL protocol is pointed out in [4]. In [4], various forms of server certificate masquerading are identified. It should also be noted that the attack described is a man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack that requires direct manipulation of the SSL protocol. This paper is a mirror of [4] and involves client certificate masquerading. The motivation for this paper comes from the fact that this anomaly has shown up in commercial products. It is potentially more damaging than [4] since a MITM attack is not involved and the only requirement is that the application trust a given root certificate authority (CA). The problem arises when applications use multiple roots that do not cross-certify. The problem is further exasperated since the applications themselves do not have the ability to apply external name constraints and policies. Unfortunately, the problem is a fairly well known problem within the public key infrastructure (PKI) community, but continues to persist in practice despite this knowledge.
机译:伪装对SSL协议的证书问题是指出的[4]。在[4]中,识别各种形式的服务器证书伪装。还应注意,所描述的攻击是需要直接操纵SSL协议的中间人(MITM)攻击。本文是[4]的镜子,涉及伪装客户证书。本文的动机来自这一事实,即这种异常在商业产品中出现。由于不涉及麻省理工验管理攻击,因此潜在的攻击可能更具损害,并且唯一的要求是应用程序信任给定的根证书颁发机构(CA)。当应用程序使用不交叉证明的多根根源时,出现了问题。由于应用程序本身没有能够应用外部名称约束和策略,因此该问题进一步恼火。不幸的是,问题是公钥基础设施(PKI)社区内的一个相当众所周知的问题,但尽管有这些知识,继续持续存在。

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