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Adaptive Oblivious Transfer and Generalization

机译:自适应令人沮丧的转移和泛化

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Oblivious Transfer (OT) protocols were introduced in the seminal paper of Rabin, and allow a user to retrieve a given number of lines (usually one) in a database, without revealing which ones to the server. The server is ensured that only this given number of lines can be accessed per interaction, and so the others are protected; while the user is ensured that the server does not learn the numbers of the lines required. This primitive has a huge interest in practice, for example in secure multi-party computation, and directly echoes to Symmetrically Private Information Retrieval (SPIR). Recent Oblivious Transfer instantiations secure in the UC framework suffer from a drastic fallback. After the first query, there is no improvement on the global scheme complexity and so subsequent queries each have a global complexity of O(|DB|) meaning that there is no gain compared to running completely independent queries. In this paper, we propose a new protocol solving this issue, and allowing to have subsequent queries with a complexity of O(log(|DB|)) while keeping round optimality, and prove the protocol security in the UC framework with adaptive corruptions and reliable erasures. As a second contribution, we show that the techniques we use for Oblivious Transfer can be generalized to a new framework we call Oblivious Language-Based Envelope (OLBE). It is of practical interest since it seems more and more unrealistic to consider a database with uncontrolled access in access control scenarios. Our approach generalizes Oblivious Signature-Based Envelope, to handle more expressive credentials and requests from the user. Naturally, OLBE encompasses both OT and OSBE, but it also allows to achieve Oblivious Transfer with fine grain access over each line. For example, a user can access a line if and only if he possesses a certificate granting him access to such line. We show how to generically and efficiently instantiate such primitive, and prove them secure in the Universal Composability framework, with adaptive corruptions assuming reliable erasures. We provide the new UC ideal functionalities when needed, or we show that the existing ones fit in our new framework. The security of such designs allows to preserve both the secrecy of the database values and the user credentials. This symmetry allows to view our new approach as a generalization of the notion of Symmetrically PIR.
机译:在Rabin的精细纸中引入了令人沮丧的转移(OT)协议,并允许用户在数据库中检索给定数量的线条(通常是一个),而不会发现服务器的哪些线路。确保服务器只有每个交互可以访问此给定的线路,因此其他人受到保护;虽然用户确保服务器不学习所需行的数量。这一原语在实践中具有巨大的兴趣,例如在安全的多方计算中,并直接回应对称私人信息检索(SPER)。最近的令人沮丧的转移实例化在UC框架中遭受了激烈的回力。在第一个查询之后,全局方案复杂性没有改进,因此随后的查询每个都具有o(| db |)的全局复杂性,这意味着与运行完全独立的查询相比没有增益。在本文中,我们提出了一种解决此问题的新协议,并允许在保持圆形最优性的同时具有o(log(| db |))复杂性的后续查询,并在具有自适应损坏和自适应损坏中证明UC框架中的协议安全性。可靠的擦除。作为第二款贡献,我们表明我们用于忽持的转移的技术可以推广到我们称之为令人沮丧的语言的信封(OLBE)的新框架。它具有实际兴趣,因为在访问控制方案中考虑具有不受控制的访问的数据库似乎越来越不切实际。我们的方法概括了令人沮丧的基于签名的信封,以处理更多的表达凭证和来自用户的请求。当然,OLBE包括OT和OSBE,但它还允许在每条线上进行细粒网的绝密转移。例如,如果才能才能访问一行,如果他拥有授予他访问此类行的证书。我们展示了如何仿古和有效地实例化这样的原始,并证明它们在通用可替代性框架中安全,具有假设可靠的擦除。我们在需要时提供新的UC理想功能,或者我们表明现有的框架适应我们的新框架。这种设计的安全性允许保留数据库值和用户凭据的保密性。这种对称性允许将我们的新方法视为对称PIR概念的概念。

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