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SKI Research Project on Defence in Depth PSA – Assessing Defence in Depth Levels with PSA Methods

机译:深度PSA防御滑雪研究项目 - 用PSA方法评估深度水平的防御

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One of the basic requirements for nuclear safety is to maintain and to develop the defence in depth (DiD) principles. The overall aim is to prevent deviations from normal operation from occurring and, if prevention fails, to detect and limit their consequences, and to prevent any escalation to more serious conditions. In principle, the PSA can be used to investigate the application of defence in depth in that it addresses the frequency of initiating events that challenge nuclear safety (DiD Levels 1 and 2), the probability of failure of safety systems and the frequency of core damage (DiD Level 3), the probability of bypass or failure of the containment and the frequency of a large (early) release (DiD Level 4) and effectiveness of the off-site emergency response measures and the frequency of social and economic consequences (DiD Level 5). However, there is currently no direct assessment of DiD levels with PSA. An SKI research project is making an inventory of the potential and possible methods for using PSA in evaluating and ranking the system structures and components (SSCs) being part of the different DiD levels. The project identifies and describes different current evaluations of the DiD levels including by whom, when and how. The current use of PSA results and the possibility for extended use of PSA results in evaluating DiD levels is investigated. The objective is to evaluate the current DiD levels, evaluation of the impact on DiD levels due to plant changes and evaluation of the importance of plant events (LERs, etc) for the SSCs belonging to each DiD level. The project is divided into five steps 1) identification and structuring of the SSCs that belong to each DiD level and that should thus be considered for potential PSA evaluation, 2) mapping of different measures for each level, 3) identification of existing PSA results that can be used to assess the DiD level and SSCs, development of possible new PSA measures that can be used, requirements on PSA model, and need for PSA model extensions and adaptation, 4) test calculations and finally 5) a test of the credibility of the proposed methods and results as well as the interpretation of the results. The project and its preliminary findings and results are presented.
机译:核安全的基本要求是维持和发展深度(DID)原则的防御。整体目标是防止偏离正常操作发生,如果预防失败,以检测和限制其后果,并防止任何升级到更严重的条件。原则上,PSA可用于调查防御的应用深度应用,因为它解决了挑战核安全性的启动事件的频率(DID 1和2),安全系统失败的可能性以及核心损坏的频率(3级),旁路或遏制失败的概率和大(早期)释放(DID级别4)的频率和场外应急措施的有效性以及社会和经济后果的频率(确实如此5级)。但是,目前没有直接评估与PSA的DID水平。滑雪研究项目正在进行使用PSA在评估和排列系统结构和组件(SSCS)中作为不同DID水平的一部分的潜在和可能方法的库存。该项目识别并描述了DID水平的不同当前评估,包括由谁,何时以及如何。研究了PSA结果的使用和扩展使用PSA的可能性导致评估DID水平。目的是评估当前的水平,对植物事件(LER等)对属于每个DID水平的SSC的植物事件(LER等的重要性,对植物事件(LER等)的影响的影响的影响。该项目分为五个步骤1)识别和构建属于每个DID级别的SSC,因此应该考虑到潜在的PSA评估,2)每个级别的不同措施的映射,3)识别现有的PSA结果可用于评估DID水平和SSCS,开发可能的新PSA措施,可以使用,对PSA模型的要求,并需要PSA模型扩展和适应,4)测试计算,最后5)测试可信度的测试建议的方法和结果以及结果的解释。该项目及其初步调查结果及其举报。

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