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Hardware Attack and Assurance with Machine Learning: A Security Threat to Circuits and Systems

机译:硬件攻击与机器学习的保证:对电路和系统的安全威胁

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Summary form only given, as follows. The complete presentation was not made available for publication as part of the conference proceedings. Banking, defence applications and cryptosystems often demand security features, including cryptography, tamper resistance, stealth, and etc., by means of hardware approaches and/or software approaches to prevent data leakages. The hardware physical attacks or commonly known as side channel attacks have been employed to extract the secret keys of the encrypted algorithms implemented in hardware devices by analyzing their physical parameters such as power dissipation, electromagnetic interference and timing information. Altered functions or unauthorized modules may be added to the circuit design during the shipping and manufacturing process, bringing in security threats to the deployed systems. In this presentation, we will discuss hardware assurance from both device level and circuit level, and present how machine learning techniques can be utilized. At the device level, we will first provide an overview of the different cryptography algorithms and present the side channel attacks, particularly the powerful Correlation Power Analysis (CPA) and Correlation Electromagnetic Analysis (CEMA) with a leakage model that can be used to reveal the secret keys of the cryptosystems. We will then discuss several countermeasure techniques and present how highly secured microchips can be designed based on these techniques. At the circuit level, we will provide an overview of manufactured IC circuit analysis through invasive IC delayering and imaging. We then present several machine learning techniques that can be efficiently applied to the retrieval of circuit contact points and connections for further netlist/functional analysis.
机译:摘要只给出,如下所述。完整的陈述未作为会议诉讼程序的一部分提供出版物。银行,防御应用程序和密码系统通常需要安全性功能,包括通过硬件方法和/或软件方法来防止加密,防篡改,隐身等,以防止数据泄漏。已经采用硬件物理攻击或通常称为侧信道攻击,以通过分析其物理参数(例如功率耗散,电磁干扰和定时信息)来提取在硬件设备中实现的加密算法的密钥。在运输和制造过程中,可以将更改的功能或未经授权的模块添加到电路设计中,为已部署的系统带来安全威胁。在本演示文稿中,我们将讨论从设备级和电路级别的硬件保证,并展示如何利用机器学习技术。在设备级别,我们将首先提供不同加密算法的概述,并呈现侧信机攻击,特别是具有泄漏模型的强大相关功率分析(CPA)和相关电磁分析(CEMA),可用于揭示密码系统的秘密键。然后,我们将讨论几种对策技术,并提出了如何基于这些技术设计高度安全的微芯片。在电路级别,我们将通过侵入式IC延迟和成像提供制造的IC电路分析概述。然后,我们提出了几种机器学习技术,可以有效地应用于用于进一步的网表/功能分析的电路接触点和连接的检索。

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