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Detection Games with a Fully Active Attacker

机译:用完全活跃的攻击者检测游戏

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摘要

We analyze a binary hypothesis testing problem in which a defender has to decide whether or not a test sequence has been drawn from a given source P_0 whereas, an attacker strives to impede the correct detection. In contrast to previous works, the adversarial setup addressed in this paper considers a fully active attacker, i.e. the attacker is active under both hypotheses. Specifically, the goal of the attacker is to distort the given sequence, no matter whether it has emerged from P_0 or not, to confuse the defender and induce a wrong decision. We formulate the defender-attacker interaction as a game and study two versions of the game, corresponding to two different setups: a Neyman-Pearson setup and a Bayesian one. By focusing on asymptotic versions of the games, we show that there exists an attacking strategy that is both dominant (i.e., optimal no matter what the defence strategy is) and universal (i.e., independent of the underlying sources) and we derive equilibrium strategies for both parties.
机译:我们分析了一个二进制假设检测问题,其中防御者必须决定是否已经从给定的源P_0绘制了测试序列,而攻击者努力阻止正确的检测。与以前的作品相比,本文寻址的对手设置考虑了一个完全活跃的攻击者,即攻击者在两个假设下处于活动状态。具体而言,攻击者的目标是扭曲给定的序列,无论是从P_0出现的,都会让防守者混淆并诱导错误的决定。我们将Defender攻击者交互作为游戏,研究两个版本的游戏,对应两个不同的设置:Neyman-Pearson设置和贝叶斯人。通过专注于游戏的渐近版本,我们表明存在攻击策略,这些策略是主导(即,无论防御战略是什么)和普遍(即独立于潜在来源),我们获得均衡策略双方。

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