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Online Welfare Maximization of Sponsored Viral Marketing with Stochastically Arriving Spreaders

机译:随机到达的传播者可最大化赞助病毒式营销的在线福利

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Selecting k seed users in online social networks (OSNs) as spreaders to publish advertisements so that the final information spread is maximized, is the well-studied influence maximization problem. Studies have been focusing on a static pool of potential spreaders and ignoring their autonomy. In fact, as influential users in OSN, spreaders may act at their own discretion. Their availabilities are affected by both their logging in time and their willingness to participate in a marketing campaign. From the perspective of the advertiser, spreaders arrive stochastically. Instead of selecting spreaders on their own, advertisers usually delegate the task to a professional advertising platform and simply buy impressions. Comparing to the short time that spreaders spend on publishing advertisements, multiple advertisers exist simultaneously and are relatively static with much longer durations. Therefore, it is the platform's responsibility to properly distribute advertisements to stochastically arriving spreaders, or equivalently, allocate spreaders to sponsors. The goal is to maximize the sum utilities of all parties, i.e. the social welfare. In this paper, we propose the online simple-greedy algorithm for such allocation problem. We prove the algorithm is guaranteed to achieve an expected welfare of at least 1-1/e to the expected offline optimum, and further show it is the best that a polynomial-time algorithm can achieve. Moreover, we discussed extensions with different diffusion models and also conduct experiments on real datasets to show the performance of the greedy algorithm.
机译:在在线社交网络(OSN)中选择k个种子用户作为传播者来发布广告,以使最终信息传播最大化,这是经过充分研究的影响最大化问题。研究一直集中在潜在的传播者的静态池上,而忽略了它们的自治性。实际上,作为OSN中有影响力的用户,传播者可以自行决定采取行动。登录时间和参与营销活动的意愿都会影响其可用性。从广告商的角度来看,吊具是随机到达的。广告商通常不会自行选择分发器,而是将任务委派给专业的广告平台,然后简单地购买展示次数。与传播器花费在发布广告上的时间短相比,多个广告商同时存在,并且相对静态,持续时间更长。因此,平台的责任是正确地将广告分发给随机到达的吊具,或者等效地,将吊具分配给赞助商。目标是最大化各方的总和效用,即社会福利。在本文中,我们针对这种分配问题提出了在线简单贪心算法。我们证明了该算法可以保证达到预期的离线最优值至少1-1 / e的预期福利,并进一步证明了多项式时间算法可以实现的最佳效果。此外,我们讨论了具有不同扩散模型的扩展,还对真实数据集进行了实验以显示贪婪算法的性能。

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