Auction is widely applied in spectrum distribution. However, due to the exaggerated fee asked in firstly-distributed market, the Secondary Users (SUs) cannot benefit from such auction directly. Spectrum Holders (SHs) prefer to release their idle channels for the sake of saving cost and yielding profit. However, channels provided by SHs differ in spacial and frequency domains. In other words, heterogeneity of channel is one of the most challenging obstacles in spectrum auction. In most current spectrum auction mechanisms, buyers are charged the same fee but employ disparate channels. Similarly, channels are assigned to different buyers but paid the same fee which is unreasonable. Therefore, we propose pHSA, which is the first auction scheme brings the damage one winning pair causes to other participants into the pricing schedule. We demonstrate that pHSA has a fine economic properties such as truthfulness, individual rationality and budget balance. Our evaluation results show pHSA performs better than McAfee in profit of the auctioneer.
展开▼
