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Game between Government and Developers under the Subsidy Policy of Prefabricated Buildings

机译:在预制建筑物补贴政策下政府和开发人员之间的比赛

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At present, in order to promote the prefabricated construction, the state has formulated a series of government subsidy policies. However, due to the asymmetry and imperfection of information, the equilibrium between government and companies is affected by the cost of fraud and the risk cost of being discovered, while the government is in the inferior position of information asymmetry. This article considers the factors such as the research and development costs of prefabricated construction, the costs under traditional construction methods, the time cost of funds, the impact of goodwill, the cost of fraud, government costs of different monitoring methods, subsidy costs under different subsidy policies, environmental benefits obtained through the use of prefabricated buildings. By using the Bayesian game model, we can analyze the real estate developers' payout and the government's payoff and then provide theoretical support to subsidy policy.
机译:目前,为了促进预制建设,国家制定了一系列政府补贴政策。然而,由于信息的不对称和不完美,政府和公司之间的均衡受到欺诈成本的影响和所发现的风险成本,而政府处于信息不对称的劣势。本文考虑了预制结构的研究和开发成本,传统施工方法的成本,资金时间成本,商誉的影响,欺诈成本,不同监测方法的政府成本,不同的补贴成本补贴政策,通过使用预制建筑获得的环境效益。通过使用贝叶斯游戏模型,我们可以分析房地产开发商的支付和政府的回报,然后为补贴政策提供理论支持。

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