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A Game Theory Analysis in Trade Security of Iron Ore

机译:铁矿石贸易安全博弈分析

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The structure of bilateral oligopoly in iron ore international trade makes the monopoly profit, and the means to divide the monopoly profit is the pricing of iron ore. From the game analysis on pricing in iron ore international trade , this article find that the pricing right can bring the price-maker first-mover advantage, thus, both in the buyers and sellers, oligarchs have incentive to obtain the pricing right, and the relatively intensity of the competition determines their bargaining strength. In the pricing right competition of iron ore international trade, there is effect of "advantage of the weak", but the effect is limited. So, for releasing the pressure from the durative increase of iron ore price, the steel enterprises of China should take both the pricing right competition and increase of bargaining strength into account, and to design strategy on the aim of changing the relatively intensity of pricing right competition between buyer and seller.
机译:铁矿石国际贸易双侧寡头垄断的结构使垄断利润,划分垄断利润的手段是铁矿石的定价。从博弈分析中的铁矿石国际贸易分析中,本文发现定价权可以带来价格制造商的首先换货优势,因此,在买家和卖家中,寡头都有奖励获得定价权,而且相对强度的竞争决定了讨价还价的力量。在铁矿石国际贸易的定价竞争中,有效果“弱势的优势”,但效果有限。因此,为了释放来自铁矿石价格的持续增长的压力,中国的钢铁企业应考虑定价竞争和增加谈判的力量,并旨在改变相对强度的定价强度买方和卖方之间的竞争。

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