Repeated sponsored search auction with non-decreasing bid values

摘要

We apply ascending biding behavior of English auction to solve the revenue loss problem of generalized second price auction (GSP) in repeated sponsored search auction (SSA) for the search engine provider (SEP). The mechanism proposed in this paper is denoted by Non-decreasing Sponsored Search Auction (NDSSA). We focus on analyzing SEP''s revenue lower bound and auction efficiency after converging. We proof that SEP''s revenue in NDSSA is at least equal to α times of that in Vickrey-Clarke-Groves auction (VCG), while α is the reciprocal of the first click-through rate (CTR). Since any CTR is normalized to a decimal, SEP in NDSSA will obtain more revenue than in VCG. Moreover, NDSSA is efficient, and advertisers with higher valuations will be ranked in better slots.