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Analysis of outsourcing pricing for fourth party logistics enterprise based on bilateral bargaining game with asymmetric information

机译:基于信息不对称双边谈判博弈的第四方物流企业外包定价分析

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The fourth party logistics(4PL) must outsource the logistic tasks after obtaining them from the manufacturer, therefore, we use bargaining game to analyze the outsourcing. In the bargaining game, 4PL and manufacturer's earnings will not be zero when both sides can not reach an agreement. This is due to the fact that manufacturer will spend money to search, inspect and assess the new 4PL who can provide logistic service for him after that. And it will also cost 4PL some money to search for new customers. We call these costs cause by failure of the deal conversion costs. Using asymmetric information Bilateral bargaining game, we analyze the factors that affect the deal price and the dealing conditions between 4PL and manufacturer. Comparing the game with switching cost and without switching cost, we conclude that in the game without switching cost, manufacturer with a high degree of patience will get a smaller earning if a deal is concluded in the first phase. Once we take into account switching cost, manufacturer and 4PL get different earning in different domain.
机译:第四方物流(4PL)必须在从制造商处获得后勤任务后将其外包,因此,我们使用讨价还价博弈来分析外包。在讨价还价游戏中,当双方无法达成协议时,4PL和制造商的收入将不会为零。这是由于制造商将花费金钱来搜索,检查和评估新的4PL,此后可以为他提供物流服务的事实。寻找新客户也将花费4PL一些钱。我们称这些成本为交易转换成本失败的原因。使用非对称信息双边谈判博弈,我们分析了影响4PL与制造商之间的交易价格和交易条件的因素。比较具有转换成本和无转换成本的游戏,我们得出的结论是,在没有转换成本的游戏中,如果在第一阶段达成交易,那么耐心程度较高的制造商将获得较少的收益。一旦考虑了转换成本,制造商和4PL在不同的领域将获得不同的收益。

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