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Capital Supervision and Commercial Bank’s Credit Behavior Choice

机译:资本监督与商业银行的信用行为选择

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This paper creates a preference index of credit behavior to describe the behavior preference and the risk preference of banks, introduces the implementation and loosening of capital requirements into calculation model, conducts an empirical test by making use of 522 data sample points of 29 banks in the China from 2002 to 2006. It gets the conclusions that the more rigorous capital requirements will result in the greater credit structure adjustment, the steadier business and the lower risks, and the looser capital requirements will result in the more active capital structure of commercial banks and the higher business risks.
机译:本文建立了信用行为的偏好指标来描述银行的行为偏好和风险偏好,将资本要求的实施和放宽引入计算模型,并利用29家银行的522个数据样本点进行了实证检验。从2002年到2006年的中国。得出的结论是,资本要求越严格,信贷结构的调整就越大,业务越稳定,风险越低,而资本要求越宽松,商业银行和金融机构的资本结构就越活跃。较高的业务风险。

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