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Game Analysis of Optimal Proportional Reinsurance under Complete Information

机译:完全信息下最优比例再保险的博弈分析

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When a reinsurance policy is signed,there is a conflict of interest between the original insurer and re-insurer to deal with,which is expressed in the choice of a mutually acceptable price for the policy.We define a game between the original insurer and re-insurer by means of which insurer can make a justified choice of the rate of reinsurance and the re-insurer choose the premium of reinsurance.We analyze and solve the game to determine the optimal proportional reinsurance under complete information.
机译:当签订再保险单时,原始保险人与再保险人之间存在利益冲突,这在保单双方可接受的价格选择中得到体现。我们定义了原始保险人与再保险人之间的博弈。 -保险公司可以通过它来合理选择再保险费率,再保险人选择再保险保费。我们分析和求解博弈,以在完整信息下确定最优比例再保险。

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