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Safeguards System Analysis on the Withdrawal from the NPT

机译:《不扩散核武器条约》退出的保障制度分析

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During the past review processes on the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), there had been proposals for addressing a withdrawal from the NPT to ensure non-diversion of all nuclear materials and equipment that a withdrawing state acquired while a party to the NPT. If the nuclear items transferred to the withdrawing state are not subject to safeguards and are diverted for military purposes, the withdrawal from the Treaty would be a major threat to international non-proliferation and security. In this meaning, this paper aims to evaluate whether the continuity or perpetuity of safeguards application on the nuclear items after the NPT withdrawal would be secured. In general, there are three types of safeguards agreements: item-specific safeguards agreement referred to as INFCIRC/66, comprehensive safeguards agreement referred to as INFCIRC/153, and safeguards requirements under bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements (NCAs). Each agreement contains the terms for duration of the agreement and penalties for non-compliance, which are directly connected to the NPT withdrawal. This paper considers four cases developed by combinations of the agreements and examines whether the continuous application of safeguards is possible in each case. The results of the examination show that the continuity or perpetuity of safeguards application on nuclear items transferred to a withdrawing state under the safeguards agreements of INFCIRC/66 type and the safeguards requirements under bilateral NCAs is secured, while it is not secured under the safeguards agreement of INFCIRC/153 type, after the NPT withdrawal. To legally ensure non-diversion of all nuclear materials and equipment transferred to the withdrawing state, this loophole in the INFCIRC/153 agreement should be closed with revision of the terms for its duration, which makes it vulnerable to the NPT withdrawal, or with stipulation of the clear relation between the terminations of the agreement and the safeguards in the agreement. In the bilateral NCAs, additional efforts will be made, as a condition of supply, to secure the continuity or perpetuity of safeguards application on nuclear items to be transferred from suppliers to recipients.
机译:在过去的《不扩散核武器条约》(不扩散条约)审查过程中,曾提出解决不扩散条约的建议,以确保不撤回一个当事国在当事国获得的所有核材料和设备。加入《不扩散核武器条约》。如果转移到撤出国的核项目不受保障,并转用于军事目的,则从条约中撤出将对国际防扩散和安全构成重大威胁。从这个意义上讲,本文旨在评估在确保《不扩散核武器条约》撤回之后对核项目实施保障监督的连续性或永久性。一般而言,共有三类保障协定:被称为INFCIRC / 66的针对特定项目的保障协定,被称为INFCIRC / 153的全面保障协定以及双边核合作协定(NCA)下的保障要求。每项协议均包含协议期限和不遵守规定的罚款,这些条款与《不扩散核武器条约》的撤消直接相关。本文考虑了由协议组合形成的四个案例,并研究了在每种情况下是否都可以连续应用保障措施。审查结果表明,根据INFCIRC / 66型保障协定和双边国家共同协议的保障要求,对转移到退出国的核项目实施保障的连续性或永久性是有保障的,而在保障协定中没有保障在《不扩散核武器条约》撤回之后,其型号为INFCIRC / 153型。为从法律上确保不转移转移至撤回状态的所有核材料和设备,应通过修订其期限的条件来弥补INFCIRC / 153协议中的这一漏洞,使其容易受到《不扩散核武器条约》的撤回或规定的约束。协议终止与协议中的保障措施之间的明确关系。在双边国家禁止协议中,作为供应的条件,将做出进一步的努力,以确保对将要从供应商转让给接受方的核项目实施保障的连续性或永久性。

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