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Safeguards System Analysis on the Withdrawal from the NPT

机译:保障关于退出的系统分析

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During the past review processes on the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), there had been proposals for addressing a withdrawal from the NPT to ensure non-diversion of all nuclear materials and equipment that a withdrawing state acquired while a party to the NPT. If the nuclear items transferred to the withdrawing state are not subject to safeguards and are diverted for military purposes, the withdrawal from the Treaty would be a major threat to international non-proliferation and security. In this meaning, this paper aims to evaluate whether the continuity or perpetuity of safeguards application on the nuclear items after the NPT withdrawal would be secured. In general, there are three types of safeguards agreements: item-specific safeguards agreement referred to as INFCIRC/66, comprehensive safeguards agreement referred to as INFCIRC/153, and safeguards requirements under bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements (NCAs). Each agreement contains the terms for duration of the agreement and penalties for non-compliance, which are directly connected to the NPT withdrawal. This paper considers four cases developed by combinations of the agreements and examines whether the continuous application of safeguards is possible in each case. The results of the examination show that the continuity or perpetuity of safeguards application on nuclear items transferred to a withdrawing state under the safeguards agreements of INFCIRC/66 type and the safeguards requirements under bilateral NCAs is secured, while it is not secured under the safeguards agreement of INFCIRC/153 type, after the NPT withdrawal. To legally ensure non-diversion of all nuclear materials and equipment transferred to the withdrawing state, this loophole in the INFCIRC/153 agreement should be closed with revision of the terms for its duration, which makes it vulnerable to the NPT withdrawal, or with stipulation of the clear relation between the terminations of the agreement and the safeguards in the agreement. In the bilateral NCAs, additional efforts will be made, as a condition of supply, to secure the continuity or perpetuity of safeguards application on nuclear items to be transferred from suppliers to recipients.
机译:在过去审查核武器条约的条约(NPT)的过程中,有提案解决了向不扩散核武器特人提出的撤销,以确保所有核材料和设备的非转移撤销在缔约方获得的撤销国向不扩张。如果转移到撤回国家的核项目不受保障并转移为军事目的而转移,则该条约的撤回将是对国际不扩散和安全的重大威胁。在这一意义上,本文旨在获得保障在不断提款后保障措施在核项目上申请的连续性或永久性。一般而言,有三种类型的保障协议:项目特定的保障协议被称为Infcirc / 66,综合保障协定,称为Infcirc / 153,并根据双边核合作协议(NCAS)保护要求。每项协议载有协议持续时间和对不合规性的罚款的条款,这些条款直接与“不扩散核武器条约提款”。本文考虑了协议组合开发的四个案例,并在每种情况下考察是否可以持续申请保障措施。考试的结果表明,根据“双边NCA的保障协定”在“撤销”协议下转移到撤回州的核项目的连续性或永恒性,并确保双边NCAS下的保障要求,而在保障协定下没有担保NPT退出后的INFCIRC / 153类型。合法确保所有核材料和设备转移到撤回国家,INFCIRC / 153协议中的这种漏洞应通过修订其持续时间的修订,这使得不受不断的撤销或规定易受攻击协议终止与协议的保障之间的明确关系。在双边NCAS中,将作为供应条件制定额外的努力,以确保维护对核项目申请的连续性或永久性从供应商转移到接受者。

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