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Improved Key Recovery Attacks on Reduced-Round AES with Practical Data and Memory Complexities

机译:具有实用数据和内存复杂性的,对减小的AES的改进的密钥恢复攻击

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Determining the security of AES is a central problem in cryptanalysis, but progress in this area had been slow and only a handful of cryptanalytic techniques led to significant advancements. At Euro-crypt 2017 Grassi et al. presented a novel type of distinguisher for AES-like structures, but so far all the published attacks which were based on this distinguisher were inferior to previously known attacks in their complexity. In this paper we combine the technique of Grassi et al. with several other techniques to obtain the best known key recovery attack on 5-round AES in the single-key model, reducing its overall complexity from about 2~(32) to about 2~(22.5). Extending our techniques to 7-round AES, we obtain the best known attacks on AES-192 which use practical amounts of data and memory, breaking the record for such attacks which was obtained 18 years ago by the classical Square attack.
机译:确定AES的安全性是密码分析的核心问题,但是该领域的进展缓慢,只有少数密码分析技术才能取得重大进展。在2017年Euro-crypt上,Grassi等人。他提出了一种新型的类似于AES的结构的区分器,但是到目前为止,所有基于该区分器的已发布攻击在复杂性方面均不如先前已知的攻击。在本文中,我们结合了Grassi等人的技术。使用其他几种技术来获得单密钥模型中对5轮AES的最著名的密钥恢复攻击,从而将其总体复杂度从大约2〜(32)降低到大约2〜(22.5)。将我们的技术扩展到7轮AES,我们获得了对AES-192的最广为人知的攻击,该攻击使用了实际的数据和内存,打破了18年前通过经典Square攻击获得的此类攻击的记录。

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