Since the late 1980s and early 1990s, many countries gradually started the reforms of port policy. Comparing with other countries which are on the same boat, the regulatory reforms of the Chinese port system was on the process of deregulation of foreign investment which means that there were more sectors allowed to be invested, like port sector, Sino-foreign joint venture, even wholly foreign-owned terminal. Nowadays, China has formed different capital natures of container terminals, such as the state investment, foreign investment, bank loans, self-raised funds, and IPO. This study presents an analysis of the pricing policy between two container terminals using a game theoretical model of two-stage non-cooperative. Our main finding is that the pricing policy adopted by the container terminal depending on its capital nature, and the Nash equilibrium is for both container terminals to adopt the not price-matching policy or foreign investment terminal; to adopt the price-matching policy while state investment terminal; to adopt the not price-matching policy.
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