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Reducing DNS cache poisoning attacks

机译:减少DNS缓存中毒攻击

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摘要

The increasing attacks on The Domain Name System (DNS) and the problems faced in deploying Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC) on a large scale, result in the need of a simple, and a practical approach to safeguard the DNS. In this paper, we present an efficient approach to significantly reduce the success rate of DNS cache poisoning attacks. The proposed Shift Key(S-Key) based domain name encoding scheme considerably raises the entropy of the DNS packet by encoding the domain name, using the randomly generated 4 bit S-Keys. To successfully poison a DNS cache, the attacker must now guess the 4 bit S-key as well as the encoded domain name, in addition to the port number and the transaction ID. The Bi-Query scheme captures the malicious reply packets by initiating a re-query or pairing up two consecutive requests to resolve the same domain name, thereby validating the Internet Protocol (IP) address retrieved for each domain name, before caching it. The first method proposed makes it difficult for the attacker to guess the DNS packet fields, while the latter detects and discards any packet that has been forged.
机译:对域名系统(DNS)的攻击日益增多,以及大规模部署域名系统安全扩展(DNSSEC)所面临的问题,导致需要一种简单实用的方法来保护DNS。在本文中,我们提出了一种有效的方法来显着降低DNS缓存中毒攻击的成功率。提出的基于Shift键(S-Key)的域名编码方案通过使用随机生成的4位S-Key对域名进行编码,大大提高了DNS数据包的熵。为了成功破坏DNS缓存,攻击者现在除了端口号和事务ID外,还必须猜测4位S键以及编码的域名。 Bi-Query方案通过启动重新查询或配对两个连续的请求以解析相同的域名来捕获恶意回复数据包,从而在缓存每个域​​名之前验证为每个域名检索的Internet协议(IP)地址。提出的第一种方法使攻击者难以猜测DNS数据包字段,而后者则检测并丢弃已伪造的任何数据包。

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