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Detection of DNS Cache Poisoning Attack in DNS Standard Resolution Traffic

机译:DNS标准解析流量中DNS缓存中毒攻击的检测

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摘要

We statistically investigated the total A resource record (RR) based DNS query request packet traffic from the Internet to the top domain DNS server in a university campus network through January 1st to December 31st, 2010. The obtained results are: (1) We found five DNS Cache Poisoning (DNSCP) attacks in observation of rapid decrease in the unique source IP address based entropy of the DNS query packet traffic and significant increase in the unique DNS query keyword based one. (2) Also, we found five DNSCP attacks in the score changes for detection method using the calculated restricted Damerau-Levenshtein distance (restricted edit distance) between the observed query keyword and the last one by employing both threshold ranges through 1 to 40. Therefore, it is possible that the restricted Damerau-Levenshtein distance based detection technology can detect the DNSCP attacks.
机译:我们对截至2010年1月1日至12月31日从互联网到大学校园网络中顶级域DNS服务器的基于A资源记录(RR)的DNS查询请求数据包的总流量进行了统计调查。获得的结果是:(1)我们发现五个DNS缓存中毒(DNSCP)攻击,用于观察基于DNS查询数据包流量的基于唯一源IP地址的熵的迅速下降和基于唯一DNS查询关键字的熵的显着增加。 (2)另外,我们通过使用从1到40的两个阈值范围,使用观察到的查询关键字与最后一个查询关键字之间的计算出的受限Damerau-Levenshtein距离(受限编辑距离),在检测方法的得分变化中发现了五种DNSCP攻击。 ,基于Damerau-Levenshtein距离的受限检测技术可能可以检测DNSCP攻击。

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