首页> 外文会议>IEEE International Performance Computing and Communications Conference >Pricing and revenue sharing mechanism for secondary redistribution of data service for mobile devices
【24h】

Pricing and revenue sharing mechanism for secondary redistribution of data service for mobile devices

机译:用于移动设备数据服务的二次重新分配的定价和收益共享机制

获取原文

摘要

Cellular Network Providers (CNP) provide users with wireless data access to meet the growing ubiquitous demand for the Internet. As users subscribe to a fixed data plan for a monthly flat fee, some users may exhaust their data allowance before the end of the billing cycle, while others underutilize their monthly quota. To take advantage of such underutilization, Khausik et. al. propose a mechanism for ad hoc bandwidth redistribution that allows subscribers to sell their unused bandwidth to users needing Internet access in exchange for some financial compensation as and when opportunities arise. There exists a popular belief that allowing such on-demand ad hoc service is not beneficial to CNP. This paper seeks to address and counter this opinion by proposing a pricing scheme and a revenue sharing mechanism that makes the provision of ad hoc connection advantageous to CNP. Our revenue sharing mechanism provides economic incentives to CNP. The simulation results show that our revenue sharing model ensures that CNP receives the majority portion of the revenue gained, regardless of the amount. Secondly, our pricing model ensures traffic from ad hoc users has minimal impact on the connection quality of current subscribers. In this model, we use Shapley value as the basis for deriving the revenue sharing.
机译:蜂窝网络提供商(CNP)为用户提供无线数据访问,以满足对Internet日益增长的普遍需求。当用户订阅固定数据计划并按月收取固定费用时,一些用户可能会在结算周期结束之前用尽其数据配额,而另一些用户则未充分利用其每月配额。为了利用这种未充分利用的优势,Khausik等。 al。提出一种用于临时带宽重新分配的机制,该机制允许订户在机会出现时将其未使用的带宽出售给需要Internet访问的用户,以换取一些经济补偿。人们普遍认为,允许这种按需的即席服务对CNP不利。本文旨在通过提出一种定价方案和一种收益共享机制来解决和反驳这种观点,该机制使提供临时连接对CNP有利。我们的收益分享机制为CNP提供了经济激励。仿真结果表明,我们的收益共享模型可确保CNP收到收益的大部分,而不管其金额如何。其次,我们的定价模型可确保来自临时用户的流量对当前订户的连接质量影响最小。在此模型中,我们使用Shapley值作为得出收益共享的基础。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱:kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备:11010802029741号 ICP备案号:京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有
  • 客服微信

  • 服务号