首页> 外文会议>International conference on transportation engineering;ICTE 2011 >PROFIT DISTRIBUTION OF COMPLETE SETS OF EQUIPMENT LOGISTICS OUTSOURCING
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PROFIT DISTRIBUTION OF COMPLETE SETS OF EQUIPMENT LOGISTICS OUTSOURCING

机译:成套设备物流外包的利润分配

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According to the logistic difficulty of different complete sets of equipment, complete sets of equipment will be divided into general logistics and large categories. And on this basis, in considering the case of market demand, a model of logistics outsourcing equipment is established. According to analyze the supply chain profit and their own profits from centralized decision and non-cooperative game, it is proved that the profit on centralized decision is greater than the profit of non-cooperation. Logistics outsourcing prices ultimately does not affect the market price , but belongs to the internal problems of supply chain system in the condition of centralized decision, and the ultimate market prices is a positive correlation function of the price of logistics outsourcing in the condition of non-cooperative game. The last, Robin Stein bargaining model is adopted to distribute the remaining profit produced by cooperation, and it is proved that Robbins bargaining model can achieve Pareto optimal allocation.
机译:根据不同成套设备的后勤难度,成套设备将分为一般物流和大类。在此基础上,考虑市场需求,建立了物流外包设备模型。通过对供应链利润及其来自集中决策和非合作博弈的利润进行分析,证明集中决策的利润大于非合作博弈的利润。物流外包价格最终不影响市场价格,但在集中决策的情况下属于供应链系统的内在问题,而最终市场价格是非外包条件下物流外包价格的正相关函数。合作博弈。最后,采用Robin Stein讨价还价模型分配合作产生的剩余利润,证明Robbins讨价还价模型可以实现帕累托最优分配。

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