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Mean-field games and green power control

机译:平均场比赛和绿色电源控制

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摘要

In this work, we consider a distributed wireless network where many transmitters communicate with a common receiver. Having the choice of their power control policy, transmitters are concerned with energy constraints: instantaneous energy-efficiency and long-term energy consumption. The individual optimization of the average energy-efficient utility over a finite horizon is studied by using control theory and a coupled system of Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman-Fleming equations is obtained. Even though the existence of a solution to the corresponding stochastic differential game is proven, the game is difficult to analyze when the number of transmitters is large (in particular, the Nash equilibrium analysis becomes hard and even impossible). But when the number of transmitters is large, the stochastic differential game converges to a mean-field game which is ruled by a more tractable system of equations. A condition for the uniqueness of the equilibrium of the mean-field game is given.
机译:在这项工作中,我们考虑了一个分布式无线网络,其中许多发送器与一个公共接收器进行通信。可以选择功率控制策略,从而使发射机关注能源约束:瞬时能源效率和长期能源消耗。利用控制理论研究了有限水平范围内平均节能效用的个体优化,并获得了Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman-Fleming方程的耦合系统。即使已经证明了对相应的随机差分博弈的解决方案的存在,但是当发射机的数量很大时,很难对博弈进行分析(特别是纳什均衡分析变得困难,甚至是不可能的)。但是,当发射器的数量很大时,随机微分对策会收敛于均值场博弈,该均值博弈由更易处理的方程组控制。给出了平均场博弈均衡唯一性的条件。

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