Cooperation on International Safeguards between IAEA and South Africa

摘要

South Africa started co-operation with the IAEA in the 1960s with facility type agreements(INFCIRC/66) for the SAFARI-1 Research reactor and Koeberg Nuclear Power Station reactors.No further agreements were concluded until termination of the South African(SA)weapons programme and ratification of the NPT in 1991.Thereafter intense co-operation ensued with the IAEA through signing of a comprehensive safeguards agreement(INFCIRC/153),preparation of the completeness report for nuclear material inventory and nuclear facilities;and implementation of the comprehensive safeguards agreement.Notably, at this early stage SA already granted access to IAEA Inspectors to any facility at any location within SA in a fully co-operative and transparent manner. SA has endeavored to strengthen the international safeguards regime through participation in various IAEA activities(e.g.MSSP,Programme 93+2 and SAGSI),IAEA Board of Governors and General Conference;and field trials on environmental sampling and RMS.In 2002 the Additional Protocol (INFCIRC/540)entered into force.Through the IAEA support programme quantification and verification of HEU/LEU in waste from the weapons programme and other nuclear facilities was intensely pursued until the present day. Working towards a more effective and efficient SSAC the SA safeguards system was ISO 9001 certified in 2003.Best practices of the SA SSAC were shared in an IAEA SSAC workshop and through the preparation of the IAEA Nuclear Materials Accounting Handbook.SA participates in voluntary reporting schemes such as import and export of nuclear materials.Further,SA fully co-operated with the IAEA in investigating the clandestine manufacture of enrichment plant components in SA destined for Libya. On a regional basis SA in conjunction with the IAEA hosted a regional seminar to promote the conclusion of Additional Protocols by African States and an African Regional workshop for SSACs.SA and the IAEA are evaluating and assessing the verification and control systems at SA borders of mineral ores containing Uranium and metals(e.g.Cobalt and Copper)containing high levels of Uranium as impurities. SA historical nuclear capabilities are utilized in new technologies such as the PBMR project for which a new safeguards approach is being developed.Implementation of the IAEA State Level Approach combined with the Annual Inspection Plan and transition to IS for SA poses specific challenges.