In many disciplines success depends onaccess to scarce resources, such as unique instruments. Researchon computer-supported cooperative work has contributed to the development of technologies, such as collaboratories, that broaden access to scarce scientific and engineering resources. While broader access is often applauded, little attention has been focused on the problem of equitable and efficient resource allocation in the face of increased demand created through collaboratory use. This paper, then, uses the framework of mechanism design to evaluate different resource allocation schemes (RAD, Vickery, and knapsack). Experimental results show that knapsack achieves a more equitable distribution of resources than RAD or Vickery, but that RAD and Vickery are both more efficient than knapsack. The findings highlight the need for systematic exploration of allocation mechanisms within collaboratories, where simple optimization (e.g., knapsack) is likely to produce a sub-optimal match of resourcesto needs. More generally, the findings illustrate the utility of experimental economic approaches in understanding issues that emerge in large-scale collaborations, such as entire scientific and engineering communities.>>> af++
GB2381215A
. 2003-04-30
