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Detector Validation and Source Term Analysis of Uranyl Nitrate to Detect Diversion at Natural Uranium Conversion Facilities

机译:硝酸铀酰域检测分流在天然铀转换设施中的探测器验证与源期限分析

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Conversion, the process by which natural uranium ore (yellowcake) is purified and converted through a series of chemical processes into uranium hexafluoride gas (UF_6), has historically been excluded from the nuclear safeguards requirements of the ~(235)Ubased nuclear fuel cycle. With each step in the conversion process from yellowcake to feedstock for UF_6 enrichment, intermediary uranium oxide and uranium fluoride compounds become progressively attractive products for diversion toward noncompliant activity. The undeclared diversion of this product material could potentially provide feedstock for a clandestine weapons program for state or nonstate entities alike. With the changing global political environment and the increased availability of dual-use nuclear technology, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has evolved its policies to emphasize safeguarding this potential feedstock material in response to dynamic and evolving potential diversion pathways. Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) has developed the Uranyl Nitrate Calibration Loop Equipment (UNCLE) facility to simulate the full-scale operating conditions of a purified uranium-bearing aqueous stream exiting the solvent extraction process in a natural uranium conversion plant (NUCP). This work investigates gamma-ray signatures of uranyl nitrate (UN) circulating in the UNCLE facility and evaluates detector instrumentation sensitivity to UN. These detector validation activities include assessing detector responses to the UN gamma-ray signatures for such instruments as sodium iodide and germanium detectors. The results of gamma-ray source term modeling at various concentrations of UN will be presented as part of a comprehensive validation effort employing gamma-ray detection instrumentation for the detection of diversion from declared conversion activities.
机译:转化,通过一系列化学方法纯化并转化为六氟化铀(UF_6)的天然铀矿石(黄饼)的方法,从核保护核保护核燃料循环的核保护要求中被排除在历史上。随着从黄饼的转化过程中的每一步到UF_6富集的原料,中间体铀和氟化铀化合物变得逐渐吸引有吸引力的产品,用于转移朝向不符号的活动。该产品材料的未释放转移可能是秘密武器计划的原料,适用于州或非适用实体。随着全球政治环境的不断变化和增加的双用核技术可用性,国际原子能机构(原子能机构)已经发展了其政策,以强调响应动态和不断发展的潜在转移途径来保护这种潜在的原料材料。橡木岭国家实验室(ORNL)开发了亚硝酸盐校准回路设备(叔叔)设施,以模拟在天然铀转化厂(NUCP)中的溶剂萃取过程离开溶剂萃取过程的纯化铀含水流的全规模操作条件。这项工作研究了在叔叔设施中循环的亚硝酸铀(UN)的γ射线签名,并评估了对联合国的探测器仪表敏感性。这些探测器验证活动包括评估对碘化钠和锗探测器的仪器的UNγ射线签名的检测器响应。在各种浓度的联合国伽马射线源术语建模的结果将作为采用伽马射线检测仪器检测从宣布的转换活动转移的综合验证工作的一部分。

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