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Strength of MISTY1 without FL Function for Higher Order Differential Attack

机译:不带FL功能的MISTY1的强度,可应对高阶微分攻击

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The encryption algorithm MISTY is a "provably secure" one against Linear and Differential cryptanalysis. Since the designer showed 3 round MISTY1 without FL function is provable secure, we omit FL to estimate the strength for Higher Order Differential Attack. This attack is a chosen plain text attack and uses the value of higher order differential of output to derive an attacking equation for sub-keys. The value depends on the degree of output and the degree depends on the choice of plain texts. We show that the effective chosen plain text and 5 round MISTY1 without FL is attackable using 11 different 7th order differentials. And we show the attacks to remaining sub-keys by the determined sub-keys and intermediate values. Intermediate value is a constant in the process of encryption. As the result, we can determine all sub-key in 5 round MISTY1 without FL.
机译:加密算法MISTY是一种针对线性和差分密码分析的“可证明安全”的算法。由于设计者证明不带FL功能的3轮MISTY1是可证明的安全性,因此我们省略FL来估计高阶差分攻击的强度。此攻击是选择的纯文本攻击,并使用输出的高阶微分的值来得出子密钥的攻击方程式。该值取决于输出的程度,而程度取决于纯文本的选择。我们显示,使用11种不同的7阶微分,可以有效攻击所选的纯文本和5个不带FL的MISTY1。并且我们显示了通过确定的子键和中间值对其余子键的攻击。中间值是加密过程中的常数。结果,我们可以确定5个回合中不带FL的MISTY1中的所有子密钥。

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