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Synchronous learning of efficient Nash equilibria in potential games with uncoupled dynamics and memoryless players

机译:具有解耦动态和无记忆球员潜在游戏中高效纳什均衡的同步学习

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摘要

Game theoretical learning in multi-agent systems is a rapidly developing area of research. It gained popularity since the wide range of optimization problems in multi-agent systems can be reformulated in terms of potential games, where the set of potential function maximizers represents the set of optimal system states. The crucial point of such approach is the design of a distributed algorithm that is guaranteed to converge to the set of potential function maximizers. Various learning algorithms, whose features depend on system properties, have been proposed so far. However, there is currently no learning algorithm that can be efficiently executed in a multi-agent system in which uncoupled agents update their actions synchronously and do not take into account the past history of actions. In this paper, we fill this gap by introducing a new learning algorithm for potential games with uncoupled dynamics and memoryless players who act synchronously. We prove the probabilistic convergence of this algorithm to potential function maximizers, which correspond to the optimal system states under appropriate game settings.
机译:多助理系统的游戏理论学习是一种迅速发展的研究领域。它越来越受足,因为多种代理系统中的广泛优化问题可以在潜在的游戏方面进行重新重整,其中潜在函数Maximizers表示最优系统状态。这种方法的关键点是设计了一种分布式算法,保证会聚到潜在函数最大化器集。到目前为止,已经提出了各种学习算法,其特征依赖于系统属性。然而,目前没有学习算法可以在多智能体系中有效地执行,其中未耦合代理同步更新其动作,并且不考虑过去的动作历史。在本文中,我们通过向同步行动的潜在游戏引入新的学习算法来填补这种差距。我们证明了该算法对潜在函数最大化器的概率融合,其对应于适当的游戏设置下的最佳系统状态。

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