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A study on social diffusive impacts of a novel car-navigation-system sharing individual information in Urban traffic systems

机译:新型汽车导航系统在城市交通系统中共享个人信息的社会扩散影响研究

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As one of the authors’ trials to establish a model for human-environment-social Systems, a multi-agent simulation model to deal with urban traffic congestion problems involving automobiles embedded with several strategies of car navigation systems (CNS), has been presented. A shortest time route with route information sharing strategy (ST-RIS) is believed to be one of the solutions for a novel CNS based on bilateral information shared among automobile agents. The question of which strategy is most appropriate for solving urban traffic congestion can be seen as a social dilemma, since the social holistic utility is opposite to each agent’ individual utility. The presented model shows that this social dilemma is observed as a typical Chicken type dilemma, or as a typical Minority Game, where an agent who has adopted a minority strategy can earn more utility than other strategies. Consequently, the model has illustrated that ST-pRIS, which is a further advanced strategic form of ST-RIS, here only partial information is shared among agents, has a moderate potential to be diffused in a society from the viewpoint of the evolutionary game theory.
机译:作为作者为建立人类环境社会系统模型而进行的试验之一,提出了一种多智能体仿真模型,用于处理涉及汽车的城市交通拥堵问题,该模型嵌入了多种汽车导航系统(CNS)策略。具有路线信息共享策略(ST-RIS)的最短时间路线被认为是基于在汽车代理商之间共享的双边信息的新型CNS的解决方案之一。哪种策略最适合解决城市交通拥堵的问题可以看作是一个社会难题,因为社会整体效用与每个代理的个人效用相反。提出的模型表明,这种社会困境被视为典型的鸡型困境或典型的少数族裔博弈,在这种博弈中,采用少数派策略的特工比其他策略能获得更多的效用。因此,该模型表明,ST-pRIS是ST-RIS的一种更高级的战略形式,在这里,代理之间仅共享部分信息,从进化博弈论的角度来看,它具有适度的潜力在社会中传播。 。

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