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Evolutionary game analysis on permission request policy of service providers

机译:服务提供商权限请求策略的演化博弈分析

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摘要

In view of the problem of over-requesting permissions in the current smartphone terminal, it is great significant to research the factors of the service providers to select the permission request policy. In this paper, we assume that providers are bounded rational and obtain the payoff matrix based on the two groups of providers with different request policies, which are the “Over-request Permissions” and “Request basic permissions". Then we establish an evolutionary game model for privacy protection between the two groups and find out the stability policy of the model. Initial results demonstrate that whether the provider adopts the “Request basic permissions” policy depends on four factors, which are revenue increase ratio, credit loss, users churn cost and self-attractiveness when over-requesting permissions. And the establishment of privacy alarm mechanism not only can improve the users' privacy awareness, but also increase the users churn cost when providers over-requesting permissions.
机译:鉴于当前智能手​​机终端中的权限请求过高的问题,研究服务提供商选择权限请求策略的因素具有重要意义。在本文中,我们假设提供者是有限理性的,并基于具有不同请求策略的两组提供者(即“超额请求权限”和“请求基本权限”)获得收益矩阵,然后建立演化模型。两组之间的隐私保护博弈模型并找出模型的稳定性策略,初步结果表明提供商是否采用“请求基本权限”策略取决于四个因素,即收入增加率,信用损失,用户流失过度请求权限时的成本和自我吸引力,建立隐私警报机制不仅可以提高用户的隐私意识,而且在提供商过度请求时增加了用户流失成本。

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