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Non-linear Reduced Round Attacks against SHA-2 Hash Family

机译:针对SHA-2哈希族的非线性减少的回合攻击

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Most of the attacks against (reduced) SHA-2 family in literature have used local collisions which are valid for linearized version of SHA-2 hash functions. Recently, at FSE '08, an attack against reduced round SHA-256 was presented by Nikolic and Biryukov which used a local collision which is valid for the actual SHA-256 function. It is a 9-step local collision which starts by introducing a modular difference of 1 in the two messages. It succeeds with probability roughly 1/3. We build on the work of Nikolic and Biryukov and provide a generalized nonlinear local collision which accepts an arbitrary initial message difference. This local collision succeeds with probability 1. Using this local collision we present attacks against 18-step SHA-256 and 18-step SHA-512 with arbitrary initial difference. Both of these attacks succeed with probability 1. We then present special cases of our local collision and show two different differential paths for attacking 20-step SHA-256 and 20-step SHA-512. One of these paths is the same as presented by Nikolic and Biryukov while the other one is a new differential path. Messages following both these differential paths can be found with probability 1. This improves on the previous result where the success probability of 20-step attack was 1/3. Finally, we present two differential paths for 21-step collisions for SHA-256 and SHA-512, one of which is a new path. The success probabilities of these paths for SHA-256 are roughly 2~(-15) and 2~(-17) which improve on the 21-step attack having probability 2~(-19) reported earlier. We show examples of message pairs following all the presented differential paths for up to 21-step collisions in SHA-256. We also show first real examples of colliding message pairs for up to 20-step reduced SHA-512.
机译:文献中针对(减少的)SHA-2族的大多数攻击都使用局部冲突,这些冲突对于SHA-2哈希函数的线性化版本有效。最近,在FSE '08上,Nikolic和Biryukov提出了针对减少的圆形SHA-256的攻击,该攻击使用了对实际SHA-256功能有效的局部碰撞。这是一个9个步骤的局部冲突,首先在两个消息中引入模数差1。它以大约1/3的概率成功。我们以Nikolic和Biryukov的工作为基础,并提供了接受任意初始消息差异的广义非线性局部碰撞。此局部碰撞以概率1成功。使用该局部碰撞,我们以任意初始差值对18阶SHA-256和18阶SHA-512进行了攻击。这两种攻击均以概率1成功。然后,我们介绍了局部碰撞的特殊情况,并显示了攻击20步SHA-256和20步SHA-512的两种不同的差分路径。其中一条路径与Nikolic和Biryukov提出的相同,而另一条路径是一条新的差分路径。遵循这两个差异路径的消息的概率为1。这比以前的结果有所改善,后者的20步攻击成功概率为1/3。最后,我们为SHA-256和SHA-512提出了21条冲突的两条差分路径,其中一条是新路径。这些路径对SHA-256的成功概率大约为2〜(-15)和2〜(-17),这比21步攻击的概率为2〜(-19)有所提高。我们显示了在SHA-256中遵循所有呈现的差异路径进行多达21步冲突的消息对的示例。我们还显示了冲突消息对的第一个真实示例,最多可减少20步SHA-512。

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