IS PUBLIC AND SCIENTIFIC ACCEPTANCE ACHIEVABLE IF SAFETY IS PERCEIVED TO BE COMPROMISED?

摘要

In a democratic society, scientific and public acceptances are two cornerstones to the successful siting and development of deep geological disposal systems (repositories) for long-lived radioactive wastes/materials (LLRMs). However, repository development projects are typically scientifically complex (and emotionally charged) to the point that they leave most members of the general public with the only choice to trust the scientists), engineer(s), and regulator(s) to establish and enforce an adequate level of protection of current and future generations and environments. Accordingly, if you are a scientist or member of the public, would it make you feel safe if:rn1. Two independent federal regulator agencies disagree on the level of human and environmental protection they propose for the disposal of LLRMs at a given site;rn2. This disagreement is more than 15 years old and has not been resolved despite intense reviews and intra-agency negotiation during the past two years; and/orrn3. Regulations for deep geological disposal of the same LLRMs and issued by the same regulator provide different levels of human and environmental protection after the repository is closed for different sites, particularly, if you reside in the vicinity of the site that would provide the lower level of protection?rnIn my opinion, the above regulatory dichotomy is not conducive to building scientific and public confidence in the scientific basis for any of the proposed levels of human and environmental protection. It does, however, seem conducive to fueling local opposition and successful legal challenges.rnFurthermore, if you are concerned about the suitability of a site to host a deep geological repository forrnsafe disposal of LLRMs, would you feel comfortable about any given site if:rn4. Primary reliance for long-term (post-closure) containment and isolation of the disposed LLRMs gradually changes from the natural barriers to a total reliance on unprecedented and unproven engineered barrier systems (EBSs) for the entire 10,000-year regulatory period, particularly if the EBSs were limited to provide 1,000 years of protection in the preceding regulation for the expressed purpose of ensuring that natural flaws of any given site were not compensated by EBSs;rn5. Significant increases were proposed for the performance confirmation period (from approximately 50 years to up to 300 years);rn6. Significant increases were proposed for that site the distance between the disposed LLRMs and the regulatory compliance point (from five kilometers [km] to 20 km or more) and the related level of radiation exposure point also increased significantly at the more distant compliance point;rn7. Regulations proven achievable at another site are voided to make room for less stringent and prescriptive regulations for another site;rn8. The Government voided the more stringent regulation or took any other action (third time?) to secure the continued development of the site; and/orrn9. Statements are made by the "developer" of a given site suggesting it is promising and should be developed for a spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste (HLW) repository in the absence of a final regulatory framework defining the regulatory requirements for a suitable HLW repository?rnIn my opinion, the above conditions are not conducive to building scientific and public confidence in the ability of the related natural conditions/setting to provide any substantial containment and isolation of LLRMs.