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Bundle Pricing with Comparable Items

机译:含可比较项目的捆绑定价

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摘要

We consider a revenue maximization problem where we are selling a set of items, each available in a certain quantity, to a set of bidders. Each bidder is interested in one or several bundles of items. We assume the bidders' valuations for each of these bundles to be known. Whenever bundle prices are determined by the sum of single item prices, this algorithmic problem was recently shown to be inapproximable to within a semi-logarithmic factor. We consider two scenarios for determining bundle prices that allow to break this inapproximability barrier. Both scenarios are motivated by problems where items are different, yet comparable. First, we consider classical single item prices with an additional monotonicity constraint, enforcing that larger bundles are at least as expensive as smaller ones. We show that the problem remains strongly NP-hard, and we derive a PTAS. Second, motivated by real-life cases, we introduce the notion of affine price functions, and derive fixed-parameter polynomial time algorithms.
机译:我们考虑了一个收益最大化的问题,在该问题中,我们向一组竞标者出售一组商品,每个商品都有一定数量。每个投标人都对一个或几捆物品感兴趣。我们假设知道每个捆绑包的投标人估值。每当捆绑价格由单个商品价格的总和决定时,最近证明该算法问题在半对数因子内是不可近似的。我们考虑两种确定捆绑价格的方案,这些方案可以打破这种不可近似性的障碍。两种情况都受项目不同但可比较的问题的影响。首先,我们考虑具有附加单调性约束的经典单一商品价格,这迫使较大的捆绑商品至少与较小的捆绑商品一样昂贵。我们表明,该问题仍然是NP难题,我们得出了PTAS。其次,根据实际案例,介绍仿射价格函数的概念,并推导固定参数多项式时间算法。

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