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Network Governance in the E-Lance Economy

机译:电子政务经济中的网络治理

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To date, the primary focus of global information technology management has been to examine how technologies facilitate the coordination and completion of work within multi-national organizations and improve efficiencies across global supply chains. However, the true global potential of advanced technologies is just starting to emerge. We have discovered that global connectivity has made the world flat. The future of work, especially knowledge work, might not only occur in large, command-control organizations, but through decentralized, fluid networks where individuals largely self-organize and manage themselves, in an "e-lance " economy. The goal of this paper is to develop and test a theory of network governance specific to this new emerging e-lance economy by integrating transaction cost economics with the concepts of social controls. Transaction costs are assessed by measuring demand uncertainty (# of projects and % of projects that were awarded), human asset specificity (# of bids), task complexity (average $ amount of bids and average time projects are open) and frequency (% of repeat customers and % of repeat suppliers). Social controls are assessed by measuring reputation (average supplier reputation), collective sanctions (% of suppliers getting flamed) and restricted access (projects that restrict access to who can bid). We use three measures of e-lance success: the number of project posted to the network, the average number of bids per project, and the total dollar amount exchanges on the network. We empirically test our hypotheses using data from 14,644 projects across a two-month time frame on the website - separating data collection of the independent variables and dependent variables across time. In terms of social controls, restricting access by sealing bids and notdisclosing budget amounts leads to lower levels oj bidding, but not disclosing budgets is associated with more projects being posted. In terms of transaction costs, higher average project values lead to more projects and more money being exchanged, but more bids leads to less monetary exchange. We find that the best predictor of e-lance success across all measures is the number of projects posted in the prior time period- thus active networks where there are lots of projects are the most successful over time.
机译:迄今为止,全球信息技术管理的主要重点是研究技术如何促进跨国组织内部的协调和完成工作以及提高全球供应链的效率。但是,先进技术的真正全球潜力才刚刚开始显现。我们发现全球连通性使世界变得平坦。工作的未来,尤其是知识工作,不仅可能发生在大型的,指挥控制的组织中,而且可能通过分散的,流动的网络出现,在这种网络中,个人在“电子化”经济中主要是自我组织和自我管理。本文的目的是通过将交易成本经济学与社会控制概念相结合,来开发和测试针对这种新兴的电子职业经济的网络治理理论。通过测量需求不确定性(项目数量和所授予项目的百分比),人力资产专用性(投标数量),任务复杂性(平均投标金额和项目平均开放时间)和频率(占项目百分比)来评估交易成本。回头客和回头供应商的百分比)。社会控制是通过衡量声誉(平均供应商声誉),集体制裁(被淘汰的供应商所占的百分比)和受限访问(限制访问谁可以投标的项目)来评估的。我们使用三种衡量电子招募成功的方法:发布到网络上的项目数量,每个项目的平均投标数量以及网络上的总交易金额。我们使用网站上两个月时间范围内来自14,644个项目的数据进行经验检验,以分离自变量和因变量随时间的数据收集。在社会控制方面,通过密封投标和不披露预算金额来限制访问会导致较低的投标水平,但未披露预算与发布的更多项目相关。在交易成本方面,较高的平均项目价值导致更多的项目和更多的货币被兑换,但是更多的投标导致更少的货币兑换。我们发现,在所有衡量指标中,电子职业生涯成功的最佳预测指标是前一段时间内发布的项目数量,因此,随着时间的推移,活动网络中有很多项目是最成功的。

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