Lightweight Mitigation of Hardware Trojan Attacks in NoC-based Manycore Computing

摘要

Data-snooping is a serious security threat in NoC fabrics that can lead to theft of sensitive information from applications executing on manycore processors. Hardware Trojans (HTs) covertly embedded in NoC components can carry out such snooping attacks. In this paper, we first describe a low-overhead snooping invalidation module (SIM) to prevent malicious data replication by HTs in NoCs. We then devise a snooping detection module (THANOS) to also detect malicious applications that utilize such HTs. Experimental analysis shows that unlike state-of-the-art mechanisms, SIM and THANOS not only mitigate snooping attacks but also improve NoC performance by 48.4% in the presence of these attacks, with a minimal $sim 2.15$% area and $sim 5.5$% power overhead.