首页> 外文会议>2012 AIChE spring meeting amp; 8th global congress on process safety. >Using the Integrated Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP) Study / Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA) Methodology as a Value Engineering Tool
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Using the Integrated Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP) Study / Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA) Methodology as a Value Engineering Tool

机译:使用综合危害与可操作性研究(HAZOP)研究/保护层分析(LOPA)方法作为价值工程工具

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While Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS) can be an essential element of process facility designrnto minimize the potential for process incidents, in some cases they can also be over-applied inrnthe design phases of capital projects where the Safety Instrumented Functions (SIFs) associatedrnwith the SIS are defined before the process hazards have been fully characterized. This approachrnmay provide one mechanism for achieving a robust process control system design; however, thernapplication of SIS also brings increased costs associated not only with the robust equipmentrnneeded to meet Safety Integrity Level (SIL) requirements, but also with the ongoingrnmaintenance, testing, and procedures required throughout the SIS lifecycle. In order to balancernthe important safety benefits associated with the SIS with the increased capital costs it is criticalrnto have a specific and comprehensive basis for decision-making. This paper will illustrate thernvalue engineering benefits of using the combined Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) Study andrnLayer of Protection Analysis (LOPA) methodology to comprehensively evaluate a design andrnprovide a decision-making platform for determining whether protection for process hazardsrnshould be implemented using a SIF, a Basic Process Control System (BPCS) feature, or alternaternsafeguard categories (e.g., relief valves, alarms, etc.) to ensure an adequate level of reliabilityrnwithout compromising safety. When the HAZOP/LOPA Study is performed following the valuernengineering session, the HAZOP/LOPA Study provides a critical cross-check to ensurernsafeguards are adequate and that changes made during the value engineering study do notrnintroduce additional hazards. In contrast, when the HAZOP/LOPA Study is performed prior tornthe value engineering session it provides a basis for decision making to remove SIFs or switchrnthe function to the BPCS when the risk was determined to be low by the team (as defined byrnspecific operating company criteria).
机译:尽管安全仪表系统(SIS)是过程设施设计中必不可少的要素,可以最大程度地减少发生过程事故的可能性,但在某些情况下,也可以在与SIS相关的安全仪表功能(SIF)的基本项目的设计阶段过度应用它们。在对过程危害进行充分表征之前先进行定义。该方法可以提供一种用于实现鲁棒的过程控制系统设计的机制。然而,SIS的应用不仅带来增加的成本,不仅与满足安全完整性等级(SIL)要求的坚固设备相关,而且与整个SIS生命周期中正在进行的维护,测试和程序相关。为了平衡与SIS相关的重要安全利益与增加的资本成本,至关重要的是要有一个特定而全面的决策基础。本文将说明使用危害与可操作性(HAZOP)研究和保护层分析(LOPA)方法相结合来全面评估设计并提供决策平台来确定是否应使用SIF实施过程危害保护的决策平台的价值管理工程收益;基本过程控制系统(BPCS)功能或其他安全防护类别(例如,安全阀,警报器等),以确保足够的可靠性,而又不损害安全性。在价值工程会议之后进行HAZOP / LOPA研究时,HAZOP / LOPA研究提供了关键的交叉检查,以确保有足够的保障措施,并且在价值工程研究期间所做的更改不会引起其他危害。相反,当在价值工程会议之前进行HAZOP / LOPA研究时,当团队确定风险较低时(根据特定的运营公司标准定义),该研究为删除SIF或将功能切换到BPCS提供了决策依据。 )。

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