The auction for the fraud reduction per click via a double development of prices

摘要

The auction for the fraud reduction per click via a double given prices. In the realization of auction advertising opportunities presented by a network, dual formulation of prices reduces the effects of fraudulent behaviour which causes the sample or the selection of advertisements to a bidder.In addition to an offer by selection or an offer for sample submitted by a bidder, offer constructive opposite made by the bidder is derived from the supply place and a rate of expected selections per sample. The costs resulting from the number of times the advertisement is displayed or selected are monitored.The price paid by the bidder is determined by the lowest among the two costs. The behavior of another party that makes the propaganda is fraudulently displayed or selected will not affect the bidder, unless the part has both a larger number of samples as well as a greater number of selections.To set a price on a plurality of periods of auction reduces the effect of a fraudulent behaviour perpetrated by the bidder with respect to their own advertisements.