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CLICK-FRAUD REDUCING AUCTION VIA DUAL PRICING

机译:通过双重定价降低欺诈性拍卖

摘要

In auctioning advertising opportunities presented over a network, dual pricing reduces effects of fraudulent behavior causing showing or selection of a bidder's ads. In addition to a per selection bid or per showing bid presented by a bidder, a constructive bid opposite that offered by the bidder is derived from the bid offered and a rate of expected selections per showing. Costs resulting from the number of times the ad is both shown and selected are monitored. The price paid by the bidder is determined by the lower of the two costs. Behavior by another party causing the ad to be fraudulently shown or selected will not affect the bidder unless the party causes both a high number of showings and a high number of selections. Setting a price over a plurality of auction periods reduces the effect of fraudulent behavior perpetrated by the bidder regarding its own ads.
机译:在拍卖通过网络提供的广告机会时,双重定价可减少欺诈性行为的影响,从而导致竞标者广告的显示或选择。除了投标人提出的每个选择投标或每个展示投标之外,还从提供的投标和每次展示的预期选择率中得出与投标人提供的投标相反的建设性投标。监视由广告同时显示和选择的次数引起的成本。投标人支付的价格由两项费用中的较低者确定。除非另一方引起大量展示和大量选择,否则另一方导致广告被欺诈性展示或选择的行为不会影响竞标者。在多个拍卖时段中设定价格可降低出价人对其自己的广告所犯的欺诈行为的影响。

著录项

  • 公开/公告号EP1902417A2

    专利类型

  • 公开/公告日2008-03-26

    原文格式PDF

  • 申请/专利权人 MICROSOFT CORPORATION;

    申请/专利号EP20060786992

  • 发明设计人 TALWAR KUNAL;JAIN KAMAL;

    申请日2006-07-11

  • 分类号G06Q30/00;

  • 国家 EP

  • 入库时间 2022-08-21 19:56:23

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