首页> 外文OA文献 >Characteristics of the 2009/2010 financial crisis in Greece and the probability of a bank run
【2h】

Characteristics of the 2009/2010 financial crisis in Greece and the probability of a bank run

机译:希腊2009/2010年金融危机的特征和银行挤兑的可能性

摘要

This thesis investigates in what ways, if any, the 2009/2010 financial crisis inGreece is unique and how likely a bank run is to occur in the country. To investigatethe first matter, a qualitative approach is used to determine the characteristics ofGreece’s financial crisis. The characteristics are then compared to those of earliercrises in other countries. The probability of a bank run is determined by a quantitativeapproach, using the Kaminsky-Reinhart model.Our results show that the characteristics of the financial crisis in Greece areindebtedness, the Euro, moral hazard and a non-existent acceptance for austerity.Each one of these have also been characteristics of previous crises in other countries,and thus, we do not find the crisis in Greece to be unique. However, it could beargued that some of the events leading up to the characteristics are unique. Forexample, the way in which the Greece government used its accumulated debt - togive the citizens the world’s most beneficial pension terms - is unique. If we were tochoose one crisis that resembles the one in Greece the most, the 2008 financial crisisin Latvia would be it.Signals indicating a financial crisis in Greece have been increasing since 2006/2007,and the probability of a banking crisis was 15% at the end of 2009, but would accordingto the model probably have been higher if it was not for Greece being a memberof the eurozone. A measure of the probability of a currency crisis is also obtainedthrough the model, though this number is probably an overestimate due to the Euroas Greece’s common currency. Furthermore, results from the Kaminsky-Reinhartmodel support previous research on the causality between banking crises and currencycrises; signals in Greece were indicating a banking crisis prior to a currencycrisis.
机译:本文研究了希腊在2009/2010年金融危机中有何独特之处,以及该国发生银行挤兑的可能性。为了调查第一件事,采用定性方法确定希腊金融危机的特征。然后将这些特征与其他国家早期危机的特征进行比较。我们的研究结果表明,希腊金融危机的特征是负债,欧元,道德风险和不存在紧缩政策,这是通过量化方法使用Kaminsky-Reinhart模型确定银行挤兑的可能性。这些也是其他国家先前危机的特征,因此,我们认为希腊的危机并非独一无二。但是,可以认为导致这些特征的某些事件是独特的。例如,希腊政府使用其累积债务的方式(向公民提供世界上最有利的养老金条件)是独一无二的。如果我们选择一种最类似于希腊的危机,那将是2008年拉脱维亚的金融危机。信号表明希腊的金融危机自2006/2007年以来一直在增加,而发生银行危机的可能性为15%到2009年底,但根据该模型,如果不是希腊加入欧元区,则可能更高。通过该模型也可以衡量货币危机的可能性,尽管由于Euroas希腊的通用货币,该数字可能被高估了。此外,Kaminsky-Reinhart模型的结果支持先前关于银行业危机与货币危机之间因果关系的研究。希腊的信号表明,在发生货币危机之前存在银行危机。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利

客服邮箱:kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备:11010802029741号 ICP备案号:京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有
  • 客服微信

  • 服务号