From SALT to START: Compliance behavior and the evolution of bargaining methodology in Soviet-American strategic arms diplomacy, 1972-1989.

摘要

This dissertation examines the development of Soviet-American strategic arms diplomacy from the early 1970s to the late 1980s. It argues that bargaining activity during this period produced an evolving set of operative principles, or a "methodology" of strategic arms diplomacy, which has bridged particular agreements and has tended to drive policymakers into recurring patterns of choice throughout the process. It further argues that compliance behavior has played a key role in stimulating adjustments in bargaining methodology, because both sides have pursued successive negotiations against a background of accumulating experience under the terms of older agreements. Chapter 1 introduces the dissertation's central arguments and discusses the links between compliance behavior and bargaining methodology. Chapter 2 identifies factors that may have compliance-enhancing and -inhibiting effects, and argues that treaty-constrained behavior is best viewed as a product of ongoing interactions among these factors. Chapter 3 explains why Soviet and U.S. compliance practices since 1972 are prone to conflicting assessments, and why these conflicts make it difficult to prove or disprove competing hypotheses regarding the motivations behind such behavior on the Soviet side. This chapter also assesses the historical record in light of the several factors discussed in Chapter 2 and identifies the presence of certain "structural" frictions in the Soviet-American context which were not previously considered. The study then explicates the rule-making process. For analytical purposes it defines an agreement as a composite of: framework rules, which represent the internal structure of restraint; scope rules, which are criteria for including or excluding weapons; and verification rules, which govern procedures for monitoring compliance and sorting out problems. After discussing the formative stages of the bargaining process in Chapter 4, patterns of rule-making in each category are analyzed. Chapter 5 demonstrates that a systematic progression in framework rules governing force concentration is juxtaposed against sharp discontinuities in those governing force modernization. Chapter 6 concludes that the inevitable trade-offs between preserving flexibility for oneself versus thwarting treaty circumvention by the other side has led to recurring patterns in scope rule selection. Chapter 7 discusses trends in verification rule-making and the significance of glasnost. Chapter 8 evaluates the impact of bargaining dynamics and compliance behavior upon the rule-making process from the SALT to the START eras.