首页> 外文OA文献 >Determinants of sub-sovereign bond yield spreads: the role of fiscal fundamentals and federal bailout expectations
【2h】

Determinants of sub-sovereign bond yield spreads: the role of fiscal fundamentals and federal bailout expectations

机译:次主权债券收益率利差的决定因素:财政基本面和联邦救助预期的作用

代理获取
本网站仅为用户提供外文OA文献查询和代理获取服务,本网站没有原文。下单后我们将采用程序或人工为您竭诚获取高质量的原文,但由于OA文献来源多样且变更频繁,仍可能出现获取不到、文献不完整或与标题不符等情况,如果获取不到我们将提供退款服务。请知悉。

摘要

This paper investigates to what extent yield spreads on bonds issued by sub-sovereign entities within federations are driven by bailout expectations and investorsu2019 risk appetite, as opposed to fundamental values related to default risk. The question is analysed both across and within federations using a novel dataset for sub-sovereign governments that includes Australian states, Canadian provinces, Swiss cantons, German Lue4nder, US states, Spanish communities, and Indian states. The paper finds that, regardless of the prevailing set-up of the federal system, sub-sovereign debt levels relative to GDP and global risk aversion are important drivers of sub-sovereign spreads. Moreover, within federations, the marketu2019s expectation of a federal bailout of the sub-sovereign entity and the capacity of the federal government to provide support to the weaker members of the federation affect the extent to which fundamental factors are priced into spreads. In particular, the paper shows that the positive link between debt and risk premia tends to break down when sub-sovereign government debt rises above certain thresholds. This could reflect the marketu2019s expectation of a federal bailout as fundamentals deteriorate. Additionally, larger sub-sovereign entities tend to pay higher premia as fundamentals worsen which could be linked to the limited capacity of the federal government to provide support as the size of the expected bailout increases. A pattern of rising risk premia as fundamentals worsen is also found for sub-sovereign entities when the central government faces borrowing constraints.
机译:本文研究了联邦内部的次主权实体所发行债券的收益率利差在多大程度上受救助预期和投资者风险偏好的驱动,而不是与违约风险相关的基本价值所驱动。使用适用于亚主权国家政府的新数据集,对这个问题进行了跨联邦内部和内部的分析,这些数据包括澳大利亚各州,加拿大各省,瑞士各州,德国各州,美国各州,西班牙社区和印度各州。该论文发现,无论联邦体系的现行设置如何,相对于GDP的次主权债务水平和全球避险情绪都是次主权利差的重要驱动力。此外,在联邦内部,市场对联邦对次主权实体进行救助的期望以及联邦政府向较弱的联邦成员提供支持的能力会影响基本因素被计入价差的程度。特别是,该论文表明,当次主权政府债务超过一定阈值时,债务与风险溢价之间的正向联系往往会破裂。这可能反映出市场对基本面恶化的联邦救助计划的期望。此外,随着基本面的恶化,较大的次主权实体往往会支付较高的溢价,这可能与联邦政府提供的支持能力有限有关,因为预期的救助规模会增加。当中央政府面临借贷限制时,次主权实体也发现了由于基本面恶化而导致的风险溢价上升的模式。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
代理获取

客服邮箱:kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备:11010802029741号 ICP备案号:京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有
  • 客服微信

  • 服务号