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Central Banking and Monetary Policy: What will be the post-crisis new normal?

机译:中央银行和货币政策:危机后的新常态是什么?

摘要

Central Bankers are currently facing big challenges in designing and implementing monetary policy, as well as with safeguarding financial stability, with the world economy still in the process of digesting the legacy of the crisis. The crisis has changed central banking in many ways: by shifting the focus of monetary policy from fighting too high inflation towards fighting too low inflation; by prompting new u2018experimentalu2019 non-conventional measures, which risk to cause large, long-lasting market distortions and imbalances and which also have more far-reaching distributional consequences than u2018normal, conventionalu2019 monetary policy; and by broadening central banksu2019 responsibilities particularly in the direction of safeguarding banking stability and financial stability at large. This raises several questions for the future: How long will ultra-easy monetary policies last? What are post-crisis growth trajectories, and how will the natural rate of interest rates evolve? How could an exit from ultra-easy monetary policy and a return towards higher nominal interest rates be eventually managed smoothly? Does ultra-easy monetary policy itself affect the economy in a lasting and structural way? Is the pre-crisis economic paradigm governing monetary policy still valid? If not, in what ways should it be adjusted? Are there any reasonable and practical alternatives? Against this background and given the larger post-crisis range of central banksu2019 responsibilities: is the current institutional set-up governing central banks and their relationship to government, Parliament and the financial system still appropriate? What adaptations might be considered? Would they bring an improvement or, on the contrary, a set-back to the unsuccessful policy approaches of the 1960s and 1970s? To discuss these issues, on 14 April 2016 the Baffi Carefin Center (Bocconi University) hosted a SUERF Conference. This introductory chapter aims to provide a framework for the various contributions in this book, and also summarizes some main ideas from later chapters for an overview.
机译:中央银行目前在设计和实施货币政策以及维护金融稳定方面面临着巨大挑战,而世界经济仍在消化危机的后遗症。这场危机在许多方面改变了中央银行:通过将货币政策的重点从对抗过高的通货膨胀转向对抗过低的通货膨胀;通过推出新的非常规实验性措施,这些措施可能导致长期的大范围市场扭曲和失衡,并且比常规,常规货币政策具有更深远的分配后果;通过扩大中央银行的职责,特别是在维护银行稳定和整个金融稳定的方向。这对未来提出了几个问题:超宽松货币政策将持续多长时间?危机后的增长轨迹是什么,自然利率将如何演变?最终如何平稳地控制超宽松货币政策的退出和更高名义利率的回报?超宽松货币政策本身是否会以持久和结构性的方式影响经济?危机前控制货币政策的经济范式仍然有效吗?如果没有,应该以什么方式进行调整?是否有合理可行的替代方案?在这种背景下,考虑到危机后中央银行的职责范围更大,目前管理中央银行及其与政府,议会和金融体系之间关系的机构设置是否仍然合适?可以考虑采取哪些适应措施?它们会对1960年代和1970年代不成功的政策方法带来改善还是相反?为了讨论这些问题,2016年4月14日,Baffi Carefin中心(博科尼大学)主办了SUERF会议。本介绍性章节旨在为本书的各种贡献提供一个框架,并且还总结了后面各章中的一些主要思想以进行概述。

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