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Can a unilateral carbon tax reduce emissions elsewhere?

机译:单边碳税是否可以减少其他地方的排放?

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摘要

One country that tries to reduce greenhouse gas emissions may fear that other countries get a competitive advantage and increase emissions (leakage). Estimates from computable general equilibrium (CGE) models such as Elliott et al (2010a,b) indicate that 15% to 25% of abatement might be offset by leakage. Yet the Fullerton et al (2012) analytical general equilibrium model shows an offsetting term with negative leakage. To derive analytical expressions, their model is quite simple, with only one good from each country or sector, a fixed stock of capital, competitive markets, and many identical consumers that purchase both goods. Their model is not intended to be realistic, but only to demonstrate the potential for negative leakage. Most CGE models do not allow for negative leakage. In this paper, we use a full CGE model with many countries and many goods to measure effects in a way that allows for negative leakage. We vary elasticities of substitution and confirm the analytical model's prediction that negative leakage depends on the ability of consumers to substitute into the untaxed good and the ability of firms to substitute from carbon emissions into labor or capital.
机译:一个试图减少温室气体排放的国家可能会担心其他国家获得竞争优势并增加排放(泄漏)。 Elliott等人(2010a,b)等可计算的一般均衡模型(CGE)的估计表明,减排的15%至25%可能被抵消。然而,Fullerton等人(2012年)的分析一般均衡模型显示了带有负泄漏的抵消项。为了得出分析表达式,它们的模型非常简单,每个国家或地区只有一种商品,固定的资本存量,竞争性市场,以及购买这两种商品的许多相同的消费者。他们的模型并非旨在求实,而仅是为了证明存在负泄漏的可能性。大多数CGE模型不允许负泄漏。在本文中,我们使用具有多个国家和许多商品的完整CGE模型,以允许负泄漏的方式衡量影响。我们改变了替代弹性,并确认了分析模型的预测,即负漏损取决于消费者替代无税商品的能力以及企业将碳排放替代为劳动力或资本的能力。

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