An Intuitionist Response to Moral Scepticism: A critique of Mackie's scepticism, and an alternative proposal combining Ross's intuitionism with a Kantian epistemology

摘要

This thesis sets out an argument in defence of moral objectivism. It takes Mackie as theudcritic of objectivism and it ends by proposing that the best defence of objectivism mayudbe found in what I shall call Kantian intuitionism, which brings together elements of theudintuitionism of Ross and a Kantian epistemology. The argument is fundamentallyudtranscendental in form and it proceeds by first setting out what we intuitively believe,udrejecting the sceptical attacks on those beliefs, and by then proposing a theory that canudlegitimize what we already do believe.udChapter One sets out our intuitive understanding of morality: (1) that morality isudcognitive, moral beliefs can be true or false; (2) that morality is real, we do notudconstruct it; (3) that morality is rational, we can learn about it by rational investigation;udand (4) that morality places us under an absolute constraint. The chapter ends byudclarifying the nature of that absolute demand and by arguing that the critical idea withinudmorality is the idea of duty.udIn Chapter Two Mackie’s sceptical attack on objectivism is examined. Four keyudarguments are identified: (1) that moral beliefs are relative to bfferent agents; (2) thatudmorality is based upon on non-rational causes; (3) that the idea of moral properties orudentities is too queer to be sustainable; and (4) that moral objectivism involves queerudepistemological commitments. Essentially all of these arguments are shown to beudambiguous; however it is proposed that Mackie has an underlying epistemological andudmetaphysical theory, scientific empiricism, which is (a) hostile to objectivism and (b) audtheory that many find attractive for reasons that are independent of morality.udChapter Three explores the nature of moral rationality and whether scientificudempiricism can use the idea of reflective equilibrium to offer a reasonable account ofudmoral rationality. It concludes that, while reflective equilibrium is a useful account ofudmoral rationality, it cannot be effectively reconciled with scientific empiricism. In orderudto function effectively as a rational process, reflective equilibrium must be rationallyudconstrained by our moral judgements and our moral principles.udChapter Four begins the process of exploring some alternative epistemologies andudargues that the only account that remains true to objectivism and the needs of reflectiveudequilibrium is the account of intuitionism proposed by Ross. However this account canudbe developed further by drawing upon number of Kantian ideas and using them toudsupplement Ross ’ s intuitionism.udSo Chapter Five draws upon a number of Kant's ideas, most notably some key notionsudfrom the Critique of Judgement. These ideas are: (1) that we possess a rational will thatudis subject to the Moral law and determined by practical reason; (2) that we possess audfaculty of judgement which enables us to become aware of moral properties and (3) thatudthese two faculties together with the third faculty of thought can function to constituteudthe moral understanding. Using these ideas the thesis explores whether they can serve toudexplain how intuitions can be rational and how objectivism can be justified.