Animal sentience and the precautionary principle

摘要

In debates about animal sentience, the precautionary principle is often invoked.udThe idea is that when the evidence of sentience is inconclusive, we should “give the animaludthe benefit of the doubt” or “err on the side of caution” in formulating animal protectionudlegislation. Yet there remains confusion as to whether it is appropriate to apply theudprecautionary principle in this context, and, if so, what “applying the precautionaryudprinciple” means in practice regarding the burden of proof for animal sentience. Here Iudconstruct a version of the precautionary principle tailored to the question of animaludsentience together with a practical framework for implementing it. I explain and defend theudkey features of this framework, argue that it is well-aligned current practice in animaludwelfare science, and consider and reject a number of influential counterarguments to the useudof precautionary reasoning in this area