La Chine et l'Europe de l'Est

摘要

Communist China and Eastern Europe. In order to understand China's policy in Eastern Europe since 1956 one must make an effort of imagination. First of all, one must reconstruct the situation in which Peking found itself in the 1960s, as a result of the mounting bitter political as well as ideological conflict with the great power which shares with the Chinese the longest frontier in the world (ca. 1,000,000 sq.mi.), the lands that once had belonged to the Middle Kingdom. In 1960, when the conflict first exploded, China was still weak and economically as well as militarily dependent on the Soviet Union. The fundamental character of the conflict and China's limitations made Mao determined to use all ressources and allies wherever they could be found. He had to reexamine and reappraise his country's geopolitical and ideological position, and use new unprecedented methods. Isolated from most of the world, economically underdeveloped and with a limited military potential, having at that time neither a nuclear bomb nor long range rockets, Mao had to rely primarily on political warfare. Hence the overwhelmingly ideologic overtones of the initial Chinese attacks against Moscow. In these circumstances strategic diversion camouflaged with ideological clouds was a logical choice. In this search for allies, Mao naturally enough turned his attention to the smouldering conflicts between Russia and her vassal states in Eastern Europe: Poland, Hungary, Albania, Rumania, and Czechoslovakia. By raising delicate ideological as well as political issues arising between the Center and the hegemo- nial periphery, Peking aimed at achieving three main aims: 1) to embarrass Moscow by every possible means; 2) to prevent the Russians from mobilizing their vassals in the struggle against the Chinese; 3) to strengthen and enhance China's position in the world by making friends and influencing people wherever and whenever possible, irrespective of their ideological orientation. At the present moment the ultimate consequences of the Chinese impact on Eastern Europe are difficult to assess. What seems to be certain is that, for those rulers of East Europe who are seeking greater freedom from the Soviet overlords- hip, it is comforting to know that, in their efforts, they have at least a potential backing from China. Thus, the Albanian and Rumanian ability to pursue an independent line of policy is predicated on their belief in the Russian inability to undertake any really drastic measures directed against any member of the Communist camp, in view of the Chinese reaction. We do not know what would have been Soviet policy in the case of Rumania in 1968, but for the active menacing presence of China on Russia's Far Eastern border. The credibility of the Chinese threat, however, is an open and highly controversial issue. Given the limitation of China's military capabilities, her foreign policy still naturally tends to be of a regional character and preoccupation, and her involvement in Eastern Europe is a typical example of strategic diversion. Nevertheless, it is an interesting new phenomenon pregnant with future possibilities, and hence a factor well worth further investigation.