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Perceived relative social status and cognitive load influence acceptance of unfair offers in the Ultimatum Game

机译:感知相对的社会地位和认知负荷影响Ultimatum游戏中不公平提议的接受

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摘要

Participants in the Ultimatum Game will often reject unfair resource allocations at personal cost, reflecting a trade-off between financial gain and maintenance of social standing. Although this rejection behavior is linked to executive control, the exact role of cognitive regulation in relation to status cues is unclear. We propose that the salience of status cues affects how cognitive regulation resolves the conflict between financial gain and social status considerations. Situations that tax executive control by limiting available cognitive resources should increase acceptance rates for unfair offers, particularly when the conflict between economic self-interest and social reputation is high. Here, participants rated their own subjective social status, and then either mentally counted (Load) or ignored (No Load) simultaneously-presented tones while playing two rounds of the Ultimatum Game with an online (sham) "Proposer" of either high or low social status. A logistic regression revealed an interaction of Proposer status with cognitive load. Compared to the No Load group, the Load group showed higher acceptance rates for unfair offers from the high-status Proposer. In contrast, cognitive load did not influence acceptance rates for unfair offers from the low-status Proposer. Additionally, Proposer status interacted with the relative social distance between participant and Proposer. Participants close in social distance to the high-status Proposer were more likely to accept the unfair offer than those farther in social distance, whereas the opposite pattern was observed for offers from the low-status Proposer. Although rejection of unfair offers in the Ultimatum Game has previously been conceptualized as an intuitive response, these results instead suggest it reflects a deliberative strategy, dependent on cognitive resources, to prioritize social standing over short-term financial gain. This study reveals the dynamic interplay of cognitive resources and status concerns within this paradigm, providing new insights into when and why people reject inequitable divisions of resources.
机译:Ultimatum游戏中的参与者通常会以个人成本拒绝不公平的资源分配,反映了财务收益与社会站立的维护之间的权衡。虽然这种拒绝行为与执行控制相关联,但认知调节与状态提示相关的确切作用尚不清楚。我们建议地位提示的显着性影响认知监管如何解决财务收益与社会地位考虑因素之间的冲突。通过限制可用的认知资源的税务行政控制的情况应该增加不公平优惠的接受率,特别是当经济自我利益和社会声誉之间的冲突很高时。在这里,参与者评估了自己的主观社会状态,然后在精神上计算(负载)或忽略(无负载)同时呈现音调,同时在使用高或低的在线(假)“拟议器”的两轮最终游戏社会地位。 Logistic回归揭示了提议者状态与认知负荷的相互作用。与No Load Group相比,负载组显示出高状态提议者的不公平报价的较高验收率。相比之下,认知负荷没有影响低地位提议者的不公平报价的验收率。此外,提议者状态与参与者和提议者之间的相对社交距离互动。与高地位提议者的社交距离中的参与者更有可能接受不公平的报价,而不是社会距离的那些,而从低地位提议者提供相反的模式。虽然拒绝了Ultimatum游戏中的不公平报价,但之前已经被概念化为直观的反应,但这些结果表明它反映了依赖认知资源的审议战略,以优先考虑社会在短期财务收益方面的优先级。本研究揭示了认知资源和地位问题在此范例中的动态相互作用,为何时以及为什么人们拒绝不公平的资源分裂,提供新的见解。

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