Central Bank Independence: Criteria and Indices.

摘要

The paper compares the major indices of central bank independence as presented in Bade and Parkin (1988), Alesina (1988, 1989) and Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini (1991). It focuses on three aspects: (1) is the index based on a correct (or best possible) interpretation of the central bank law; (2) is the index consistent in using all relevant criteria in determining the independence of each central bank; (3) are the indices of the various authors different or not. It describes the laws that define the competence of central banks in monetary policy making. Twelve industrial countries are examined: Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, the United States, Sweden and Switzerland. It describes the central bank laws of these countries focusing on three areas: (1) formal responsibilities (objectives) of the central bank with respect to monetary policy, (2) relationships between central banks and government in the formulation of monetary policy, and (3) procedures for appointing the board of the central bank. After a critical examination of the existing indices, it constructs its 'own' index of central bank independence.